


Agent-Based Modelling

Hugues Bersini
IRIDIA/ULB



Introduction: Weak emergence




« La cellule vivante ne contient rien que des particules minérales [...] et pourtant il est, de toute évidence, impossible que les phénomènes caractéristiques de la vie résident dans des atomes d'hydrogène, d'oxygène, de carbone et d'azote. La vie est dans le tout, non dans les parties... ».

Durkheim dans les
« Règles de la méthode sociologique »

Mac and Mic Jim

The whole is more than...

$$1 + 1 = 3$$



Three emergent phenomena:

1) A traffic jam


Mic Jim




Mac Jim





2) The ants shortest path



3) Associative memories in neural networks



Mic Jim



Mac Jim

Before all: Science has to stay reductionnist.

We need to modestly stay reductionist:

→ no vitalism, no creationism

→ no mind/body problem

→ no top-down « supervenience »

Still interesting questions:

The phenomenon emerges but « **FOR WHO???** »

Again and again the « **observer** » problem

Who is Mac Jim with respect to Mic Jim ?







Can Mic Jim perfectly predict what is seen by Mac Jim ?

→ Yes is the answer of reductionism.



Who says the truth ?

But then, **what's the legitimacy of Mac Jim ?**

Cellular automata: the perfect illustration of weak emergence



Varela Autopoiesis



Swarm robotics: weak ? strong ?



Swarm-bots

Swarm-bot
passing a gap

www.swarm-bots.org

The complex block contains the title 'Swarm-bots' in a stylized font, followed by the subtitle 'Swarm-bot passing a gap'. Below this are several logos, including the EPFL logo (École Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne) and the GENOLI-ULB logo. At the bottom, the website address 'www.swarm-bots.org' is displayed.


The big debate on emergence

=

So classical in epistemology on the status of the scientific observer



Need for observer emancipation



Weak Emergence

= epistemic

= gap impossible to analytically fill

= in the eyes of the human observer

= this new semantic domain simplifies analysis, understanding, communication

→ But everything happens « downstairs » !!!!

Strong Emergence

= ontological

= really there



But let's stay reductionist !

Engineering might help


Engineering = Strong but not spontaneous bottom-up emergence

- A car is more than the sum of its parts
- A computer too

molécules



cellules




gènes

Mais en biologie,
l'ingénieur doit être aveugle !!!

- Engineering is top-down !!!
- But the “more” is the function for the external user who gains in fitness

Between engineering and physics ... The blind watchmaker of biology

- Physics describes collective phenomenon: **the proximate cause**
- The engineer describes the function: **the ultimate cause**



Emergent phenomena are strong for natural selection

The three needed ingredients that biology provides for a collective system to be strongly emergent






Fig. 2: The three needed ingredients for a collective phenomenon to be qualified as emergent.


- **Sociology = weak emergence**
- Surprise of the whole with respect to the parts
- In contrast to statistics that brings back the macro to the micro
- Need to resort to computer simulations
- Let's consider two very celebrated examples

1) Dirk Helbing – Sociologue à Zurich

Foules sentimentales !





Un obstacle placé devant l'évacuation facilite paradoxalement l'écoulement en cas de panique





2) Thomas Schelling and segregation

- Thomas Schelling experiment
- How weak racism creates strong segregation




Thomas Schelling and segregation







Class diagram



Sequence Diagram



UML -> MDA



→ Third generation programming language

- UML could be the language adopted by natural scientists to express their knowledge
- Could help to homogenize and cross-fertilize existing models.
- We need to stop with “write once run only once !!!”
- Could improve their own understanding of their own field.
- Could disambiguate some of their knowledge
- Just three diagrams need to be understood

Three types of agents of increasing complexity



- Automata
 - Such as the birds flocking
- Interested
 - Economy, game theory
- Adaptative
 - They learn, they adapt

Four more examples

- The small world
- Emergence of cooperation
- Market Self-Regulation
- The dilemma equality/efficiency

1) The small world

Le petit monde: Duncan Watts








Figure 1. Watts-Strogatz model interpolates between a regular lattice (*left*) and a random graph (*right*). Randomly rewiring just a few edges (*center*) reduces the average distance between nodes, L , but has little effect on the clustering coefficient, C . The result is a “small-world” graph.


Mais les réseaux ne sont pas homogènes !



With aggregates




Random




Scale-Free


Poisson distribution



Power-law distribution






Exponential Network




Scale-free Network

Babarasi (début des années 2000)



Les réseaux sociaux sont « scale-free »:

$$P(k) \sim k^{-\gamma}$$



connecteurs

WWW (in)	Internet	Actor	Citation index	Sex Web	Cellular network	Phone call network	linguistics
$\gamma = 2.1$	$\gamma = 2.5$	$\gamma = 2.3$	$\gamma = 3$	$\gamma = 3.5$	$\gamma = 2.1$	$\gamma = 2.1$	$\gamma = 2.8$

2) Emergence of cooperation


Game theory and prisoner dilemma

Agent1/Agent2	Cooperate	Defect
Cooperate	(1,1)	(0, 1+x)
Defect	(1+x,0)	(0,0)





The best strategy (Nash equilibrium) is to defect but doing so you miss the Pareto solution (global cooperation).



Evolutionary Games: **Mimetism**




$$X = 0.30$$



$$X = -0.1$$




But for intermediary values $X: 0.15$




In between Schelling and Maynard-Smith

X=0.10 -> An intermediary subtle world

Final configuration



Evolutionary activity



Stay

Cooperate with all

Cooperate with same color

Communitarian movement

- Cooperation emerges by regrouping the cooperators
 - Tit-for-tat
 - Scale-free network
 - Spatial regrouping
 - Group Selection
 - Communitarian segregation

3) Market self-regulation

The El Farol Bar

El Farol - NetLogo

File Edit Tools Zoom Tabs Help

Interface Info Code

Edit Delete Add abc Button normal speed view updates on ticks Settings...

memory-size 5
number-strategies 10
overcrowding-threshold 60

setup go


Bar Attendance

ticks: 127 3D


Command Center

observer >

Same approach for market traders




VS




4) The dilemma equality/efficiency


Class Diagram



Agent's behaviour




Agent: welfare - money - tastes - skills



Agents have initial money that they spend by producing and increase welfare by consuming.

Agents have tastes and skills that are random vectors of products.



Skills → Production cost, money expenses and seller's choice.

Tastes → Welfare increase by consumption and buyer's choice

At each time step

- A randomly chosen agent produces
- A randomly chosen agent sells
- A transaction occurs → Competitive or random
- A randomly chosen agent buys and consumes.
- If no transaction turns out to be possible on account of an impossible pairing: seller/buyer:
 - >>> MARKET FAILURE !!!!!
 - >>> HAYEK's EFFICIENCY

Consumer

- The **consumer** immediately consumes what he has bought. His welfare increases by consuming according to his taste.
- Two simulations: One without **diminishing marginal utility** and one with.


Producer

- The **producer** first decides which product to produce
- Two factors: his skills and the average price of the last m transactions
- After x productions of a same product, his skill increases.
- Then all skills are renormalized

Random seller/buyer

- **Random seller** places an ask on a random product
- A **random buyer** reacts
 - If his reservation price is above the seller offer: the transaction occurs.
 - He proposes a random price above the seller offer
- The price is randomly fixed in between both offers.

Competitive buyer/seller: Double auction market



Competitive seller places a better ask for the most profitable product (thresholded by his production price)

Competitive buyer places a better bid for the most desired product (thresholded by his reservation price (tastes)).

If the two offers cross -> The transaction occurs (price = seller's)

Main results

- Four key metrics:
 1. Agent utility (aggregated and gini)
 2. Agent money (aggregated and gini)
 3. Added value (difference between production price and transaction price)
 4. MARKET FAILURES: When no transaction turns out to be possible

First simulations: 50 agents, 10 products, 50000 time steps


- Each agent is endowed with 500 units of money. **No budget constraint.**
- Number of past transactions to memorize = 100
- **No utility marginal decrease:**
 - *Random Market: Total Utility: 5390, Total Money: 24312, Gini Utility: 0.04, Gini Money: 0.007, MF: 0*
 - *Competitive Market: Total Utility: 9755, Total Money: 24491, Gini Utility: 0.27, Gini Money: 0.08, MF:0*
- **Utility Marginal decrease:**
 - *Random Market: Total Utility: 5152, Total Money: 24244, Gini Utility: 0.02, Gini Money: 0.007, MF: 0*
 - *Competitive Market: Total Utility: 5424, Total Money: 24488, Gini Utility: 0.042, Gini Money: 0.004, MF:0*
- **Main results: In case of no budgetary constrain, just taste differences increase inequality by sellers/buyers pairing in competitive markets**

Influence of the budget constraint in the competitive market.



Money	100	80	60	50	25	20	15	10
Utility	5465	5340	5464	5452	5433	5401	5330	5246
Money	4182	3275	2093	1735	494	284	83	17
Ad. Val.	3680	3720	3264	3380	2675	2400	1817	1424
G(Util)	0.05	0.061	0.077	0.070	0.088	0.12	0.16	0.25
G(Mon)	0.006	0.007	0.013	0.010	0.016	0.017	0.014	0.08
G(AV)	0.08	0.092	0.11	0.10	0.13	0.15	0.17	0.20
MF	0	0	0	0	0	26	270	914

The random market can only work until budget constraint of 50
Gini index increases while the initial budget decreases.

Gini index



Gini index growing in case of small initial budget



Conclusions: Comparison lottery/concurrence


Lottery

- Low Gini \rightarrow More equality
- Low aggregate utility \rightarrow Less efficient
- Prices don't inform as well

Concurrence

- High Gini \rightarrow Less equality
- High aggregate utility \rightarrow More efficient
- Prices inform the producers

Fondamental economy dilemma



Solutions: Redistributions
(but Okun), regulation (state),
more randomness in economy
 \rightarrow Social economy (barter)

Randomness in competition



- Random selection of 10 out of 17 contrade
- Random assignement of horse to contrade
- Random initial placement of horses

Conclusions

1. Only computer simulations allow to detect and to practice the « weak emergence ».
2. Today « Big Data » and the Web allow to validate and calibrate the models
3. A better and finer understanding of collective, emergent phenomena allow to better predict and, above all, to better regulate them (such as the crowds).